fore, any decisions that he makes subsequently are an indication of the quality of both his previous and current information. This gives rise to two conflicting effects. First, the manager may wish to make large revisions to investment to show how much he trusts his most recent observation, as in period 1. Second, if he were really talented, he would already have been close to choosing efficient investment so that a truly talented manager should change little since he has no need to. This effect leads to too little variability in investment.
Whether the manager exaggerates his position or invests too conservatively depends on the relative size of the two effects. A feature of the paper is that it provides a clear interpretation of whether exaggeration and conservatism will arise beyond the first period. If the task carried out is sufficiently routine (in the sense that the initial contribution of the manager is great), the manager "should know what is going on" after only a few observations. In this case, the manager shows excessive reliance on his previous position and does not admit mistakes, so that the variance of investment is below its first-best level. If, however, learning occurs slowly, the manager continues to exaggerate his information. In addition, we also demonstrate that managers must act conservatively beyond some specific date.
The reason that the manager ultimately becomes conservative is that the investment decisions increasingly become associated with his previous contributions over time; initially, he has made little input to the project, but eventually changing the investment becomes associated with his previous errors. The extent of this result is addressed in Section VI, where we consider situations in which this-feature of increased responsibility for errors may not be true. In particular, we consider different economic environments to provide additional comparative statics on our insights. First, we allow the true profitability of the project to change over time, where profitability follows a random walk. Here we show that conservatism becomes less likely, and indeed if the environment changes rapidly enough, the manager exaggerates forever. Therefore, the paper establishes a connection between a stable economic environment and the prevalence of conservatism. Second, we consider a case in which other information on profitability is available but the quality of that information does not depend on the manager. For example, lagged revenues could be observed. Here we show two results. First, the manager always acts conservatively with respect to this public information. Therefore, exaggeration of information can occur only if the quality of the information itself reflects the manager's talent. Second, the manager can ultimately become conservative in response to his own private information only if the quality of the best manager's information is better REPUTATION FOR LEARNING 1 109 than the quality of the other public signal. Otherwise, the manager exaggerates forever.
Section II describes the model and a few statistical results regarding normal learning over variances. In Section III, we illustrate the incentive of the manager to initially exaggerate, and Section IV considers the complementary case of conservatism. In Section V, we extend the model to examine the dynamic implications of reputation on exaggeration and conservatism. Section VI considers additional comparative statics and the robustness of our conclusions by examining extensions. Section VII reinterprets our results in the context of the behavioral decision-making literature and the recent literature in economics on reputation and herding by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) .
II. The Model
Consider a manager who commences a project in period 1 that ends in period T -1. New investment, It, is publicly chosen each period by the manager after privately observing additional information. The profit per period from investment is linear in an unknown parameter pu and concave in investment; investments fully depreciate at the end of each period. Negative investment, I, < 0, is interpreted as investment in a project negatively correlated with the return Ru. Specifically, we suppose that profitability is = JIt -i/2I2 where 1i is a productivity parameter that is symmetrically unknown before period 1, but whose distribution is commonly known to be normal with mean zero and variance 72. We assume throughout that the return to investment is specific to the firm; that is, the firm has complete property rights in the investment project. The fullinformation level of profits is obtained by setting It = Ru.
The manager receives an imperfect private observation of 1i at the beginning of each period given by mt = pu + Et whereit -X(0, u2).
The talent of the manager lies in identifying the quality of projects and varies across managers. Managerial ability is characterized by (r, with low-r managers being deemed high-ability. Ability a is specific to the manager and not to the firm. As a consequence, a manager with a reputation for high ability will obtain rents. We assume that ability is private information to the manager but is commonly known at date 0 to be distributed according to a distribution F with density If the manager was rewarded solely on the basis of profit, he would have perfect incentives and choose It = It in each period. We assume that, in addition, the manager also cares about his reputation for identifying profitability. Ideally, we would allow the manager to make investments taking account of how that investment affects not only perceptions today but also all future possibilities. However, it is well known that multiperiod incentive and learning models are inherently nonstationary, where the incentive to take an action depends on the history of previous actions and (typically more problematic) the set of actions that might be taken in the future. This often makes it impossible for such models to generate clear insights without some simplifying assumptions.2 Accordingly, we also place restrictions on preferences to simplify our analysis. Let ft-1 be all public information available at the start of period t. We assume that the manager's objective in period t is to maximize
where X > 0, and E * [crjl t-1, It] is the market's equilibrium expectation of the manager's "inability" after he observes the historical information Qt-1 and the current investment It.3 Thus our characterization of managerial preferences assumes that the manager cares only about current profits and his immediate end-of-period reputation.4 It is important that the manager cares about profits and not merely reputation; without preferences over profits, no separation can occur.
We are primarily interested in how the decisions that managers make (investments) affect how they are perceived. Consequently, for now we simplify the analysis and assume that all the updating occurs through the investments that the manager makes rather than through 2 For example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) assume the absence of income effects to generate the linearity of optimal contracts. Similarly, typical learning models such as those by Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , Holmstrom (1982) , and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) assume normality of errors plus uncertainty only over the mean of the parameters of interest, implying incentives that do not depend on previous actions.
3 Ability is assumed to matter since the manager could solicit a job elsewhere during the period, with his wage offer depending on perceived ability, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom (1982) . Our reduced form captures this phenomenon. 4 It is purely for notational simplicity that we assume that the manager's preferences are linear and time-independent in expected cr. Our results continue to hold more generally if the manager's welfare is strictly decreasing in expected a for every t, provided that the return to perceived v is independent of current profits. The ex ante variance of the type ar manager's period 1 posterior is given by V[,AIIjAO, ci -T4/(T2 + U2). A lower cr implies a higher variation of the posterior about the market's prior, 1i = 0. This arises because managers who have very precise information (low u2) will downplay the prior (high 72) and place more weight on their own information. Since the labor market does not observe ml, this will be the distribution that it will use to infer the ability of the manager.
Consider now later periods. We derive V[utI At_l, c] to determine whether the positive relationship between variance and ability described above holds beyond period 1. For all periods t > 1, optimal updating yields the result that 1i is distributed normally with mean This lemma simply shows that if the variance of the posterior is increasing (decreasing) in ability, then larger (smaller) changes in investment reflect well on the manager's ability.
B. Equilibrium Separation
The market observes investment in each period but does not directly see the posterior of the manager. Nonetheless, the manager may signal his posterior At to the market in order to indicate high ability. We show that indeed this conjecture is correct under some mild conditions. Along these lines, we concentrate our attention on separating equilibria.
First, we consider what can be signaled to the market via investment. It is immediate that in any equilibrium, separating or otherwise, the manager's choice of investment will directly depend only on historical observables, ft-1, and the actual posterior, It; a is relevant only insofar as it determines Ft. The immediate result of this is that the most informative signaling equilibria can at most separate managers of different posteriors, Ft. for any given history. Because we concentrate on fully separating equilibria, the market's sequence of posterior inferences is a sufficient statistic for fQl. Thus we can denote histories by ht' IA{*}t-(where Aue is the believed posterior of the manager in period s) and focus on the expectation of a conditional on the market's inference ht` (which is correct in equilibrium). In a separating equilibrium, the market will perfectly infer the manager's posterior from the current investment level, It, and its previous inferences, ht-l. We let 
where It*i (t-1, h t-1) = Ftt 1 and ht-= {A1t-1. . . . R Fn Note that if no inferences are drawn on ability from investments, the first-best arises since the right-hand side of (4) 
III. Overreaction and Exaggeration
Since the market does not observe the manager's information itself, it uses investment, the outcome of the information, to update its opinion about managerial quality. Suppose that at period t the relative variance is such that dd? ( Propositions I and 2 illustrate the inefficiencies in the model. Although corollary 1 illustrates that when managers initially choose projects they have a tendency to "go out on a limb," proposition 2 indicates that they fail to admit mistakes by "staying put" if the variance of the posterior is declining in ability. The manager generally becomes conservative, not because of concavity in the rewards function, but rather because he "should know what he is doing" and would not change his opinion much if he were acting honestly.
There are two conditions for proposition 2 to necessarily hold. First, the market must infer ht-1, the manager's previous beliefs. This requires that there is a strictly monotonic relationship between investment in period t -1 and p, 1; in other words, separation is required in period t -1. If there is pooling in period t -1, then it is impossible to precisely anchor the prior to determine how much the manager changes his opinion in period t.C The second condition for the propo7The implication of this is that we now must consider probability distributions over perceived changes. For example, suppose that all managers who observe I-I, -it-2 between minus one and one do not change their investments in period t -1. Then further suppose that the period t investment increases by x > 0 from period t -1. The problem this gives rise to is that the market does not know where the manager lay on the range of previous-period changes from minus one to one, and so it cannot tell how much the manager has changed his beliefs in this period. Not only does this REPUTATION FOR LEARNING 1117 sition is that X cannot be too large. Proposition 2 provides the upper bound on X such that separation will occur in period t as the unique outcome.8
Once again, we illustrate the distortions using an example in which t = 2, X = 1, and T = 3 and or is uniformly distributed on [1, 3] as the market's prior distribution (see fig. 2 ). Here we observe behavior opposite to that in figure 1, with the movement in I* being lower in absolute value than the warranted first-best investment IFB, so that there is underreaction.
V. A Dynamic Model of Exaggeration and Conservatism
So far we have shown that exaggeration always occurs in period 1 and that conservatism can occur if the variance of the posterior is decreasing in managerial ability. In this section we (i) identify those factors that make conservatism or exaggeration likely and (ii) show that after some period of time, conservatism must occur forevermore.
A. Combining Exaggeration and Conservatism in a Two-Period Model
To understand the factors leading to a switch from exaggeration to conservatism, consider the second period for which the following proposition is immediate from (2). PROPOSITION 3. If cr2 > T2V/, the manager places too much emphasis on his period 2 observation and exaggerates information. If U2 < T2V2, the manager becomes excessively conservative in period 2 and relies too little on his period 2 observation.
These conditions have a simple intuitive interpretation.9 If the measurement error cr2 for all managers is sufficiently small, the outcome is conservatism; if it is sufficiently high, exaggeration arises. One can also frame this result in terms of the type of task carried out by the manager: simpler tasks could be characterized by faster learning, but more complex tasks would be characterized by slower entail placing distributions over possible beliefs in period t -1, but the observation of changes in period t provides information on those beliefs, rendering inferences far more complicated.
8 If X becomes too large, then there is nonexistence of a separating equilibrium. Instead, pooling arises as in Bernheim (1994) .
9 This result follows immediately from the conditions on the support of (X. When learning. Then proposition 3 shows that for simpler tasks, any deviation from period 1 choices illustrates managerial error. On the other hand, with complex tasks, there is no expectation that the manager should necessarily have been close the first time, so exaggeration occurs to suggest that the manager has "some more ideas of his own."
B. A t-Period Model of Exaggeration and Conservatism
The characterization of the two-period model above is incomplete in that we have said nothing to describe period 2 behavior when cr2 < T2N-< cr. so that learning is neither very fast nor very slow. To more generally characterize outcomes, it is useful to define two variables. First, let t* be defined as the largest integer such that cr2 > T2 Vt* t* -1). This is the last time period for which a higher variance of investment necessarily implies more talent. Second, let t* be defined as the smallest integer such that cr2 < T2V\/t* t* -1). This characterizes the first time period beyond which more talented managers must show less variability in investment.
Our objective is then to determine the behavior of the manager in terms of these time "regions": from period 1 to t*, from t* + 1 to t* -1, and from -* onward. However, an additional problem arises within the possible "transition" period between t* + 1 and t* -1, as it becomes uncertain whether the manager wishes to exaggerate or act conservatively since the sign of dcr2 (cr)/dcr depends on cr. Furthermore, remember that our results on conservatism are predicated on the existence of separation in previous periods, so we need to determine whether separation will occur in this transition region, where it is not clear whether an agent wishes to exaggerate or be conservative. However, under conditions similar to those described above, separation continues to hold, so that we can indeed claim that conservatism must occur after i*. PROPOSITION This proposition segments the manager's behavior over time into three regions. Initially he exaggerates his own information since changing behavior shows that he has some ideas of his own. This occurs from period 1 to period t*. Following this, the manager may enter a transition period in which we have not characterized his behavior except to illustrate the conditions under which separation arises. However, after period i*, he becomes conservative forevermore. As a consequence, the model implies that ultimately managers become conservative. The key to understanding this result is that, over time, the prior entering each successive period is increasingly associated with the contribution of the manager. In period 1, he has made no contribution, but eventually his own opinion becomes dominant. Thus over time he is increasingly held to blame for "changing his mind." It is also worth noting here that the nature of the distortion changes over time; it is not simply that the size of the distortion changes with more observations, as is common in learning models.'0
C. Determinants of Exaggeration and Conservatism: Comparative Statics
It is important to address those factors that lend themselves to one form of distortion or the other. This issue is addressed in the following proposition."
10 It is important to point out that the critical times concern tenure on a project rather than managerial age per se. The conservatism that arises here is that when a manager has been on a project for a long time, he becomes reluctant to admit mistakes. In our model, experienced managers who are moved to new projects will once again act in an exaggerated fashion, so the model should truly be seen as addressing the effects of tenure on a project rather than aging. However, it is worth pointing out that our results rely on uncertainty about the ability of the manager. But (a/la3Ew)E[cr 'I t, .... Lol] -O 0 as t -A oc, so the distortionary effects are reduced for older managers, with project tenure held constant. As a consequence, our model suggests that the inefficiencies described above are muted for older managers.
11 Because t* and j-* are integers, the comparative statics are stated in terms of weak monotonicity. Generically, for local changes, the critical times are unaffected. For sufficiently large changes of the parameters under study, the critical times will jump discontinuously. We are interested in the direction of these discontinuous jumps.
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The critical times t*(9, T) and t*(U, T) are weakly increasing in the support of cr and weakly decreasing in T.
The results of proposition 5 follow directly from differentiation and illustrate the conflict between the quality of public and private information that generates our results. The value of the public information in our model is given by the prior, with variance T2, and the private information is parameterized by cr2. The more important private information is, the longer the region of conservatism will be. On the other hand, valuable public information leads to exaggeration. Any increase in the prior variance results in a shorter regime in which exaggeration occurs and a longer regime in which conservatism occurs as the manager's contribution builds up quickly. By contrast, the opposite occurs when the importance of private information falls, that is, as cr rises. In this sense an improvement in the quality of public information (private information) leads to a longer period of exaggeration (conservatism).'2
In addition, our model also predicts that repetition of the same action is likely to give rise to conservatism. Furthermore, both types of distortions are likely to be most important when our actions are observed by others, who are making inferences on our capabilities. Empirical work by Kiesler (1971) , Salancik (1977) , and Berg, Dickhaut, and Kanodia (1991) clearly shows that the problem of sunk costs becomes more pervasive when (i) the act is public and visible to others and (ii) the act has been performed a number of times. We see both of these results as supportive of our work.
VI. Extensions
The previous section yielded some simple comparative statics showing how each type of distortion depended on the speed of learning. The purpose of this section is to yield further insights into how decisions are made. We do this by considering two plausible extensions of the model: (i) allowing the environment to change and (ii) allowing for information that is not privately collected by the manager, such as 12 To better understand this conflict between the quality of public and private information, consider a limiting case in which the public information becomes unimportant, i.e., in which T2 , oA. In this case the only valuable information is the manager's, which should bias our results toward conservatism. To see this, note that in period 1, (a/daj1)E[Ujj~j, iio] -> 0 as T2 -> X because with a disparate prior there is almost no information on talent from the manager's choice of first-period investment. If this is the case, then exaggeration disappears and the manager chooses (almost) the efficient level of investment in period 1. But note that as r2 Ao, proposition 2 implies that conservatism always occurs in period 2 and all future periods. Therefore, eliminating public information gives rise to only the exercise of conservatism. on lagged revenues. Each subsection allows us to further refine our understanding of the likelihood of each type of distortion.
A. Changing Environments
In many instances, managers make decisions in changing environments, and the correct decision yesterday may not be appropriate today. In this subsection, we consider how a changing environment affects the distortionary behavior taken by the manager by allowing investment returns in period t (which in the previous sections were simply pu) to move according to a random walk pu = Iut_ 1 + i, where -XJ{(O, z2). A useful parameterization of z2 relates it to the market's prior variance, so we denote z2 = aT2. Note that when aX = 0, we are in our standard model with an unchanging environment. An issue that then arises is that although the manager may be relatively sure that he made the right decision last period, his current observation may still be of considerable importance since profitability may have changed.
We illustrate this issue in a two-period framework. We adapt the model of the previous section by assuming that the profits are now given by W'tIt -1/2I2, where lu = 1i and Pu2 = 1i + 4. The manager's posterior in period 1, is therefore a less precise measure of profitability for period 2 than in previous sections. In addition, the manager draws an observation in period 2, m2 = ,12 + E2, where true profitability is observed with noise in period 2. Therefore, the manager knows that the world is evolving but still realizes that his previous estimate has value. PROPOSITION 6. In a two-period setting in which the economic environment follows a random walk with variance tT 2, there exists a decreasing function K(a) with K(O) = \/2 such that, if cr2 > T2K(CX), the manager exaggerates in period 2, and if C2 < T2K(Q.), the manager is conservative in period 2. Furthermore, for (x ? 1, the manager exaggerates in period 2 independent of cr.
The effect of the changing environment is characterized by the K function. When ax = 0, profitability does not evolve over time, so that our results on period 2 behavior are unchanged; that is, ifc2 > T2V, exaggeration will always occur. However, as (x rises, the environment becomes more unpredictable, so that the region of exaggeration occurs for a wider range of parameter values, U2 > T2K(a), where K(at) < V. If the innovation in the environment is as great as the initial prior (i.e., ax ? 1), the manager exaggerates in both periods regardless of cr. Therefore, a slowly evolving environment is critical for the existence of conservatism. The reason for this is that when the underlying profitability of the projects evolves, the manager is held less to blame 1122 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY for changing investment. Indeed, if the environment evolves enough, he will be held to blame if he does not change investment from one period to the next, even if his inferences are extremely good in any period. Therefore, in a rapidly evolving environment, managers show talent by always changing behavior more than is optimal.
B. Observable Firm Profitability
So far, we have assumed that the manager receives only his own reads on the profitability of the project. As a result, the investments made over time become increasingly associated with the previous contributions of the manager. However, in reality we might imagine that other information on profitability might arise (such as lagged observations of profits). In this subsection, we consider the implication of noisy information on the profitability of the project, where the quality of the information does not reflect managerial talent. Two additional insights arise from this extension. First, with respect to this new information, the manager always acts conservatively; he will exaggerate only with respect to his own privately collected information. Second, it is no longer the case that the manager must eventually become conservative with respect to his private information; instead, he may exaggerate his information indefinitely.
In order to model this phenomenon, we adapt our model in the previous section by assuming that in all odd-numbered periods the manager receives his private observations on profitability, mt, as described in the previous sections; in even-numbered periods, the manager observes 0 = pu + I, where arj is normally distributed with mean zero and variance T2. To retain simplicity, we assume that all information is privately held when he makes the investment decision. Note, however, that the quality of the Ot information is not related to his talent. The simplest interpretation of this is that the manager receives noisy information on the revenues of the project, but does so before the market.'3 Note here that the observations on profits can be used to make inferences about the manager's ability to learn, so that not all learning occurs through investment. However, given the preferences of the manager, learning from previous data (whether from output or investments) has an effect only through the prior on the manager's ability entering a given period. We do not explicitly characterize the prior on (o using all previous data for the reason that we identify the type of distortion in period t for any nondegenerate prior on u. Therefore, our results below allow learning from revenue data.'4
Response to Own Information
In order to maintain comparability with the previous sections of the paper, the appropriate period for comparison with period t in the previous sections is now period 2t -1, since there are t private observations obtained by that time. In order to understand the effect of t managerial observations, we consider period 2t -1, where previous information is incorporated in 132t-2. Then optimal updating yields the result that p, is distributed normally with mean Differentiating this function with respect to or yields an expression that is always negative, so that the more talented the manager the less he changes his behavior. This implies that the manager always acts in a conservative fashion with respect to information whose precision is unrelated to his own ability.'6 Once again, the reason for this should be clear. The only reason for the manager to exaggerate in our model is to signal that the latest piece of information is valuable. But the quality of the O, information does not reflect his talent, and so the only effect that remains is that of conservatism. Our findings under an environment of such observable profit signals are summarized in the following proposition. PROPOSITION 7. Suppose that profits are observed with noise in even periods and X is sufficiently small (as in proposition 4). Then there exists a unique separating equilibrium. In even periods, if T c 0., exaggeration occurs; if T > c, then there exists t0 and t* such that exaggeration occurs for all t < t* and conservatism occurs for all t > -t*. In odd periods, the manager always acts conservatively.
VII. Conclusion
Economists typically think of decision making in terms of net present value calculations in which value is generally measured in terms of 16 Batchelor and Dua (1992) consider how forecasters of economic aggregates update their forecasts on the basis of information about both the forecasts of other experts and other observable information. They find that forecasters overweight their previous estimates relative to the optimal estimator, and correspondingly "in all cases their error is to give less weight to the consensus [forecast] than would be necessary to minimize expected errors" (p. 170). This is supportive of our results. See also Lamont (1995) for related empirical work. wealth or consumption flows generated by a trade. Social psychologists argue that this methodology ignores many aspects of human psychology that systematically affect the way decisions are made. A central concern of psychologists is the concept of cognitive dissonance reduction, which derives from a tension that arises when an individual holds two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent. The impact of this tension is that individuals make decisions and interpret information in order to justify to themselves previous decisions they have made.
Essentially, cognitive dissonance reduction considers individuals as rationalizing beings rather than rational beings. An important implication of attempts to rationalize previous behavior is the process of escalating commitment (or the sunk cost fallacy), where individuals commit more resources to a losing cause so as to justify or rationalize their previous behavior ( Our analysis yields outcomes similar to the base rate fallacy and the sunk cost fallacy. We do not claim that individuals do not exhibit the effects of cognitive dissonance reduction since many of the psychology results are derived under carefully controlled circumstances. Instead, our objective is to show that when individuals care about their reputations, they are likely to exhibit behavior in response to the economic incentives that is observationally equivalent to the psychological evidence.
A recent literature in economics on herding also addresses how managers may take actions in order to appear talented. First, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) consider a model in which, by assumption, untalented managers hold more disparate priors than their more talented counterparts, which implies that managers shade their decisions toward their prior. Our paper generates the dynamic correlations between variance and posteriors from more basic Bayesian updating. Furthermore, our results suggest that the opposite behav-ior must occur initially since concentrating behavior around the prior in period 1 shows a lack of talent, so our results predict "anti-herding" initially. Only after the manager has contributed to the project can conservatism occur. Therefore, although the outcome in some cases is similar to that in the herding literature, our results arise only through the impact of the manager's previous contribution. Second, a series of papers link managerial decision making to nonlinearities in rewards from outcomes.'8 For instance, Zwiebel (1995) considers how the possibility of being fired in a relative performance evaluation context induces nonlinearities in payoffs; as a result, (i) those who are behind take (efficient) risks and (ii) those who are slightly ahead of the required threshold for being retained become too conservative in the riskiness of their investments. Therefore, nonlinearities in payoffs affect risk taking. The difference between our work and this line of research is that we do not require nonlinearities in payoffs to get such results.'9 Instead inefficiencies occur in our model simply through the learning process.20
Finally, Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989) and Boot (1992) show how conservatism can occur for reasons similar to our own in the second period of a two-period model. They consider a binary investment choice model and assume that the true profitability of their project is always revealed in the second period. Their structures do not allow the possibility of exaggeration. In these circumstances, they show that conservatism can occur. The closest analogy to our model would arise if we assumed that perfect information on profitability became available in period 2. Straightforward calculations available from the authors show that adding this assumption to our model necessarily implies conservatism in period 2 and exaggeration in period 1. Thus our more general structure allows precise results even when the truth is constrained to be always revealed quickly.
To conclude, perhaps the most important points of our model of 18 See Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) for early work on the effect of nonlinearities in payoffs on investment.
19 In addition, we do not interpret conservatism as an unwillingness to take risks: we simply interpret it as an unwillingness to change previous behavior.
20 Also related to our work are the communication-based inefficiencies of herding studied by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), and Hirshleifer and Welch (1994). These papers outline how herding is likely when individuals can transmit information only through their actions . An individual who carries out a particular action is unable to tell others that he may have been close to indifferent between two actions, so that individuals follow his lead when there may be little reason to do so. A key distinction between our work and that mentioned above is that our paper holds that conservatism occurs when the individual has carried out actions on the basis of his own information before, whereas the work outlined above holds that herding is more likely when others carry out the previous actions, so that the true underlying information is in the hands of others. reputation over learning are, first, that both conservatism and exaggeration arise in predictable rational ways and, second, that they both arise from precisely the same reputation problem. Therefore, while some may argue that decision making under reputation formation is likely to lead to herding or conservatism, it is our contention that those reputation formation features that give rise to conservatism are also likely to cause exaggeration earlier in the manager's tenure on the project. Thus the two types of behavior are inextricably linked. 
Appendix
Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma
Proof of Propositions I and 2
The following lemma is useful in proving propositions 1 and 2. weakly increasing. Because the equilibrium is fully separating, this relationship must be strict. Monotonicity in turn implies that the functions are almost everywhere differentiable. To see that it is continuous in F suppose to the contrary that there were a discontinuity. In a fully separating equilibrium, the utility difference between being thought a manager with posterior 3t and one with posterior t + d' is of order 0(d'). For da sufficiently small, this is less than the fixed differences in investment that the discontinuity implies. Thus one manager would prefer to choose the allocation of the other, contradicting the hypothesis of separation. Consider condition 2. The fact that there is an equilibrium implies that an optimal I, exists for each period. Because the support of a is compact, the upper bound on any reputation effect is bounded. Because ii, is strictly concave in investment and unbounded below, we know that the optimal I, must be finite. Therefore, a necessary condition for I, is given by 
Proof of Proposition 1
We take the history ht-1 as correct and suppress its notation in the arguments below focusing only on At-1 explicitly. We then prove that separation occurs in period t, which satisfies the stated exaggeration conditions in the proposition.
Following lemma 3, we know that the set of equilibria is fully characterized by the set of increasing solutions to (4) that satisfy I*('1t~) = ,Ut-i. We first show that there exists a unique solution to the differential equation that satisfies these conditions. We then characterize the solution. We can rewrite (4) as
